European Communities (Amendment) Bill

Hansard Nice Treaty 4th July 2001 (Independence Day!)

Orders of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill
[Relevant documents: Treaty of Nice, Cm 5090; Seventeenth Report of the European Scrutiny Committee, Session 1999-2000, The 2000 IGC, HC 23-xvii, and the Government's response thereto, HC 803; Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1999-2000, on Developments at the Intergovernmental Conference 2000, HC 384, and the Government's response thereto, Cm 4893; Fifth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2000-01, European Union Enlargement and Nice Follow-up, HC 318.]
Order for Second Reading read. 
Mr. Speaker: I have selected the amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. 
3.32 pm
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time. 
The Bill implements the key decisions of the Nice European Council enshrined in the Nice treaty. The treaty was signed on 26 February this year, but will not enter into force until it has been ratified by all 15 member states of the European Union. When that happens, we shall have put in place the final institutional reforms that the European Union needs to be ready for enlargement. I wish to open this debate by placing the Bill in its proper historical context. 
Few have expressed that context more succinctly than President George W. Bush. Visiting Warsaw last month, he said: 

"Our goal is to erase the false lines that have divided Europe for too long". 
He echoed his father, who, when in office, talked of building a "Europe whole and free". 
Enlarging the European Union to take in the applicant countries of central and southern Europe has been a strategic aim of successive British Governments and our allies for more than a decade. We believe that co-operation in the European Union will bury the memory of cold war divisions just as surely as it has laid to rest the ghost of warfare in northern Europe and the spectre of dictatorship in southern Europe. 
That strategic vision carries with it immense practical benefits for Britain and for existing European Union members, as well as for countries that are soon to be new member states. It will make all of us more prosperous, safer and stronger. Enlargement will mean that British companies will be able to benefit from access to the largest single market for trade and investment in the world, with up to half a billion consumers--more than the United States and Japan put together. It will give us more allies to help to counter the cross-border threats that we face: organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. It will also give us a cleaner environment, because candidate countries are making major improvements in their air and water quality to meet EU standards. 
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I have described my approach to the European Union as that of a practical European. It is because the Government recognise the practical and strategic benefits that they have been a champion of enlargement since taking office. 
We used our presidency of the Council in 1998 to launch negotiations with the first set of six countries. At every European Council since then at which enlargement has been an issue, we have pushed for and secured rapid progress. As a result, 12 countries are now negotiating their accession, and a 13th, Turkey, has been confirmed as a candidate. 
Mr. Peter Pike (Burnley): Does my right hon. Friend recognise that the one thing that unites political parties across the spectrum in countries such as Romania is their wish to gain accession to the European Union? Those countries consider accession vital to the area to which he refers. 
Mr. Straw: I recognise that. Although there is not complete unanimity on enlargement in every country--nor would one expect that in democratic states--there is overwhelming support for it across central and eastern Europe. In the last two days, I have discussed enlargement with the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic and Croatia. While they are at different stages in their relationship with the EU, both recognise powerfully the benefits that association with it will bring, and has already brought, to their countries. 
Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife): During those discussions, did the Foreign Secretary emphasise not just the economic opportunity that the EU might provide, but the fact that membership would make it much easier for countries that have recently advanced towards democratic institutions to maintain them? 
Mr. Straw: Indeed. Although the EU began as a limited common market for coal and steel, it is important to recognise today the much wider social and cultural benefits of our coming together in a union of nation states. We should also recognise that our history is shared with the countries of eastern, southern and central Europe. They are European nations, as firmly and as surely as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We have a common heritage and a common culture, as well as a shared interest in securing a single common market for trade in goods and services. 
I was talking about the work that we have put in to pursue enlargement. Most recently at the Gothenburg European Council, just three weeks ago, we argued for and secured an affirmation that the EU's commitment to enlargement was "irreversible". Our aim is to complete negotiations by the end of 2002 for candidate countries that are ready, so that they can participate as EU members in the European parliamentary elections in 2004. When I use the word "our" in that context, I am talking in a collective sense of the decisions made by the Heads of Government in the declaration that followed their meeting. 
This timetable is bold and ambitious. If we are to achieve it, we must ratify Nice. 
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Some hon. Members argue that the results of the Irish referendum--which, by coincidence, occurred on the same day as the United Kingdom referendum-- 
Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham): And produced a much better result. 
Mr. Straw: I am glad to hear the hon. Gentleman say that the result in Ireland was much better--from his point of view, that is--than the result in the United Kingdom. I am grateful to him for confirming that the Conservative party made Europe the key issue at the last general election. It was the Conservatives, not us, who said that it was a referendum on Europe--those were their exact words--and I am sorry to say, from their point of view, that their proposition was wholly rejected by the British electorate. 
Mr. Simon Thomas (Ceredigion): The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the two contrasting referendums on Europe. One of the key features shared by the Irish referendum and the United Kingdom general election was low turnout. In Ireland, the turnout to decide the country's future within the Nice agreement was as low as 35 per cent. Does that not underline some of the difficulties that we face because Nice has not done enough to make the constitution of Europe clear to the average European citizen? We need further debate on how we can have a written constitution for Europe, and a clearer division of responsibilities and subsidiarity between nation states and emerging nation states in the EU. 
Mr. Straw: I will come to that, but I agree that we must do much more to spread comprehension among the citizens of Europe about what the EU stands for. It is not the responsibility of our citizens to make sure that they understand. It is the responsibility of the EU's member states and central institutions--especially the Commission--to ensure that the project is properly and better understood by our citizens. The EU acts in their name and for their benefit. Ultimately, the future of the EU and of each state is in their hands. 
Donald Anderson (Swansea, East): Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Opposition should be cautious about enthusiastically espousing the result of the Irish referendum? Only 18 per cent. of those who voted there voted against the proposition, and the opposition was led by Sinn Fein--not the most plausible anti-militaristic campaigners. Is not the real lesson for all of us that we must connect with our electorates on European matters? 
Mr. Straw: I agree. The alliance of forces that formed in the Republic of Ireland was interesting. The environmentalist Green party--whose views I respect, although I do not agree with them in totality--joined with Sinn Fein, one of whose objections to the Nice treaty was that it could lead to the "militarisation" of Europe. Of course, Sinn Fein members know far more about militarisation than many of the rest of us. 
I shall deal in more detail with the Irish referendum. I have not concealed from the House my disappointment at the result, but we have to respect it. The question of 
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turnout has been raised. In free democracies where voting is not compulsory, people are as free not to vote as they are free to vote. People must make their own choices about that, but everyone--those who do vote and those who do not--must respect the decision that is arrived at. 
It would be hopeless if politicians were to say that a vote was not entirely legitimate because the turnout only reached a certain level. As far as I am aware, with the exception of Australia, where voting is compulsory, all western democracies recognise and respect the rule that people are entitled not to vote but that they must respect the decision reached by those who do vote. 
It is fundamental to the democratic legitimacy of the EU that changes to the founding treaties do not take place unless and until the constitutional procedures of all 15 member states have been satisfied. However, for all of us the clear lesson of the Irish result is that we cannot afford to take public support for the EU for granted. 
The Irish Government have made it clear that they will need to address particular issues with their electorate, just as the Danish Government did when their electorate rejected Maastricht in 1992. The other 14 member states formally resolved at the General Affairs Council three weeks ago that they were ready to help Ireland to find solutions. In the meantime, all 15 member states, including Ireland, have agreed that we should proceed with the enlargement negotiations and our own ratification procedures. Only by doing so will we be ready by the end of next year to admit new members. 
If, however, Ireland does not ratify, the treaty will not enter into force. The position is as simple as that. 
However, no member state, and least of all the Irish Government, has followed the example of some Conservatives and called for a wholesale renegotiation of the Nice treaty. 
Sir Teddy Taylor (Rochford and Southend, East): Does the Foreign Secretary accept that the Nice treaty transfers a further 39 areas of decision making to the majority vote process, and that 90 per cent. of EU decisions are now made by majority vote? Might not the fact that direct democracy is becoming increasingly irrelevant explain why poll turnouts are declining? Should we not warn the people of eastern Europe that the EU path does not lead to democracy, but away from it? 
Mr. Straw: I accept, of course, that the treaty proposes an extension of qualified majority voting, but I do not accept, with respect, the hon. Gentleman's political arithmetic. There is a big difference between putting a unit of one on maintaining the veto on tax, which we still do, and putting an equal unit of one on accepting qualified majority voting, in place of a veto, on the registrar of the Court of First Instance. The two are not cognate. 
If the hon. Gentleman reads the treaty, he will see that a range of bureaucratic issues on which it was ridiculous for the veto to be applied have been transferred to QMV. The other areas that have been moved to QMV concern trade, on which it is in our interests that other people should not exercise a veto. My experience in the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which does everything by unanimity, has been interesting. On some issues, we could, and have, maintained a veto, but a veto blocks change. 
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We are in the vanguard of change to reform the European Union. The Opposition's reasoned amendment states that they want reform, but they set out no method or process by which they can deliver it. On a range of issues, we need to ensure that we can override the slowest: those with the deepest vested interest in the existing structures, which everyone agrees do not work entirely satisfactorily. 
The achievement of my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House, my predecessor as Foreign Secretary, was to ensure that if subjects went to the heart of our status as a nation state--tax, defence, social security and other matters, including the signature of treaties such as the one before us--they should continue to be subject to unanimity. However, in other areas, where we have an interest in progress and reform, the QMV system was sensible. 
Mr. Francis Maude (Horsham): The Foreign Secretary said that it was agreed by the General Affairs Council that each country should proceed with its ratification proceedings, notwithstanding the Irish referendum vote. Does he recall that in 1992 the shadow Cabinet, of which he was a member, urged strongly, in the similar circumstances of the rejection of the Maastricht treaty by the Danes, that the ratification Bill for that treaty should be postponed? The then Opposition leader urged the then Prime Minister that the Bill should be postponed until the matter was fully resolved. John Major accepted that urging and the Bill was indeed postponed. Why was postponement right then, but not now? 
Mr. Straw: The answer is that life is a learning process, at least for this side of the House. I kept saying in the previous Parliament that Opposition Members should learn from our experience in opposition. I even offered them free seminars throughout the four years that I was Home Secretary, and I would have provided them, because I found it tragic that there were some Opposition Members of considerable talent who could have helped to improve Government by improving themselves as an Opposition, but did nothing about it. 
The situation in 1992 was new, but the right hon. Gentleman quotes at me the position of the shadow Cabinet. I could quote back at him the position of the then Cabinet, which took the opposite point of view. The Opposition are now calling for all sorts of responses to the Irish referendum. He was a Minister in 1992. He actually signed the Maastricht treaty and then lost his seat. 
Mr. Bercow: There was no causal link. 
Mr. Straw: The right hon. Gentleman still lost. The General Affairs Council, which included his successor as Minister after the 1992 general election, agreed unanimously that the other 14 member states should proceed with the ratification of Maastricht. After discussion with Denmark, including some accommodation by the EU, and a further referendum, the Danes agreed to continue with the treaty. 
Mr. Maude: The Foreign Secretary inadvertently misrepresents what the then Government did. They listened to the very proper concerns expressed by the shadow Cabinet and others that the Bill should be postponed, and it was. The House did not return to it until 
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the matter was resolved by the Danish public. There was a consensus in the House that it was wrong to proceed with the treaty's ratification while its final form was unresolved because of the Danish referendum decision. 
Mr. Straw: My recollection of the mood around Maastricht in 1992 is that it was anything but consensual. One difference is that there was a Council decision before the Bill was introduced. The sequence of events was that the Council met on 11 June, the Monday after the election. We made a decision, in the light of that meeting, to introduce the Bill subsequently, and the timetable was different. 
The other difference, if the right hon. Gentleman wants to argue the case, is that Maastricht, on any analysis, involved more significant and fundamental changes to the treaties and the basic constitution of the European Union than does this Bill. 
Mr. Bercow rose-- 
Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East) rose-- 
Mr. Straw: I have given way a great deal and I should like to make some progress. If there is time, I shall take some more interventions. 
I spoke earlier of meeting the Foreign Ministers for Croatia and for the Czech Republic over the past two days. The Foreign Minister for the Czech Republic is Jan Kavan, a man whose own life symbolises the huge change that has occurred in Europe in my adult lifetime. I first met Jan Kavan 33 years ago, in the Endsleigh street headquarters of the British National Union of Students. I was then the deputy president of the NUS, an organisation whose own politics had, to some extent, been dominated by the cold war. 
Jan was a student leader too, from what was then Czechoslovakia, but he had none of our freedoms. Instead, he was a victim, along with thousands and thousands of others, of the cold war--of the undemocratic authoritarian regimes imposed on one central European country after another. He effectively went into exile in London to muster support after Dubcek's reforms in the Prague spring had been brutally crushed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
Today the Czech Republic is one of the most successful of central Europe's new democracies. Jan told me today of the huge efforts that his country and the other applicants have put into preparing to join the European Union. They see accession as putting the seal on their admission to the family of European democracies. Jan told me how important it was for the Czech Republic and for every other applicant that Nice be ratified on schedule. 
If the right hon. Gentleman is interested in enlargement which apparently he is, according to the Opposition's reasoned amendment, he owes it to the applicant countries as much as we do to proceed with ratification. There is no basis for us holding up ratification because of the Irish referendum. 
Over the coming years, we expect to complete negotiations with up to 12 applicant countries. I invite the House to imagine for a moment what a European Union of 27 member states would look like if we did not make 
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the changes agreed at Nice. The Opposition's so-called reasoned amendment--and if ever there were an oxymoron, that is it-- 
Mr. Bercow: You spent 18 years doing them. 
Mr. Straw: Ours were very much better--they included reasons. They were not contrary to reason. 
The Conservatives' reasoned amendment says that the Bill fails to modernise institutions of the European Union. Yet that is exactly what the Nice treaty does. The Opposition have no policies that I have been able to discern that could conceivably command the support even of two or three other member states, still less of 14, on securing the modernisation inherent in the Nice treaty. 
Without the Nice treaty and the changes that it makes, as each small new country joined the European Union, so relatively would the weight and influence of the larger countries diminish. Eventually, countries that together could not muster a majority of the European Union's population could, however, form a majority for the purposes of passing EU legislation. That would plainly be unacceptable. 
As the Community grew, so, too, would the European Commission, until it resembled a mass meeting rather than the coherent, delivery focused body that we want it to be. With 27 vested interests capable of imposing 27 vetoes on much new legislation, many areas of collective decision making that are vital to our interests would slowly grind to a halt. Therefore, at last year's intergovernmental conference, we set out with the explicit purpose of solving those problems. At Nice, we achieved a deal that did just that. Nice is necessary for enlargement. 
The deal secured by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook), was not only good for Europe but excellent for Britain. I normally refrain from quoting from leaked documents, but the European Commission's internal assessment of Nice is now a matter of public record. It said: 

"It was a European Council of strong emotion, with winners (this time the UK and Spain) and losers (Belgium, Portugal, Germany and the Commission)". 
There is no question but that the nation state of the United Kingdom achieved what it set out to achieve at Nice. 
Mr. William Cash (Stone) rose- 
Dr. Julian Lewis rose-- 
Mr. Bercow rose-- 
Mr. Straw: I give way to the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow). 
Mr. Bercow: The Foreign Secretary is certainly making the best fist of a poor case, although his heart does not seem to be in it. As long ago as 18 June 1997, the Prime Minister trumpeted in this House the alleged merits of the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the treaty of Amsterdam. However, since then no fewer than 4,995 European Union directives, regulations and decisions 
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have impacted on this country. Can the right hon. Gentleman identify one practical example of a benefit to this country arising from the passage of that protocol? 
Mr. Straw: Yes, I can. There are plenty of issues on which the Commission and the Council hold back, leaving matters to member states. We are Europeans and a huge amount of our trade depends on our membership of the European Union. [Interruption.] I am being asked to prove negatives, but there are a huge number of examples, when, by definition, if the Commission has not produced a directive, the matter has been left to individual member states. That has happened in a huge number of areas. Of course, such issues do not appear on the agendas of the Council or the Commission because they have not been brought forward as European legislation. Instead, they have been left to individual member states. 
The hon. Member for Buckingham asked whether the directives have benefited this country. One set of regulations and directives that has benefited this country is that on the single market. We have tried to extend the single market into sectors--particularly all kinds of services--that are still the subject of unjustified competition. That cannot be achieved by individual legislation by the individual nation states. It requires that there should be legislation for 15 nations to ensure that practices that we regard as unjustifiable and restrictive are eliminated across Europe. Who benefits from that? Our constituents, this country and our economy. They would not benefit if we returned to the environment which the hon. Gentleman imagines we could achieve in a different world that I do not recognise. 
A further important point about Nice was that, for the first time since we joined the then Common Market in 1973, we won an increase in the UK's voting weight. Our nominal voting power in the Council will rise from 10 votes to 29 votes, and although the total votes will increase as well, we shall have significantly more influence relative to smaller countries. For example, we used to have three times as many votes as Denmark, but under Nice we shall have four times as many. That also means that France, Germany and the United Kingdom together will still be able to block any proposal that they dislike. Moreover, the UK will retain voting parity with Germany, despite Germany's greater population. 
At Nice, we also succeeded in providing for a smaller and better Commission. From 2005, there will be one Commissioner per member state. Once the EU has 27 members, the number of Commissioners will be capped below that figure and there will be a system of equal rotation. As I said in reply to the hon. Member for Rochford and Southend, East (Sir T. Taylor), we secured more qualified majority voting in areas where that is in Britain's interests. I have already explained why we need to extend qualified majority voting in some areas while insisting on the veto in others. 
In Nice, my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and my predecessor secured for Britain all the goals that we had set out in our White Paper in February last year. That was an outstanding result, which was deservedly praised in the national press and media and in most parts of the House. 
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Mr. Cash rose-- 
Mr. Straw: I give way for the last time. 
Mr. Cash: Will the Foreign Secretary note that, contrary to what he said, Britain's share of the vote has declined substantially, from 11.5 to 8.4 per cent.? Will he, if he is interested, be good enough to reply to the points in a pamphlet that I have produced today, entitled "Constructive Opposition to the Nice Treaty--the Dangers of European Integration"? 
Mr. Straw: Of course, I will do my best to read the document, if the hon. Gentleman sends it to me. I am not sure what time scale he was using for his arithmetic. If he was going back to 1973, when the total number of member states was nine, all I can say is that of course we would have had a larger proportion of any qualified majority voting that happened then or shortly afterwards. There are now 15 members states; in future there will be 25, and eventually, if Turkey joins, there will be 28. 
My point, which is incontrovertible, is that Nice gives us a relative increase in our voting strength. [Interruption.] That is a fact. During the Committee proceedings, we can, and no doubt will, talk at great length about that aspect of the arithmetic. I have already given the House the comparison that we now have three times as many votes as Denmark, and under the Nice treaty, we shall have four times as many. It is important that the countries with the largest proportion of the population should be able to exercise, roughly speaking, a proportionate vote. 
Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): Will the Foreign Secretary give way? 
Mr. Straw: No, I need to make progress because many hon. Members, including no doubt the hon. Gentleman, want to speak. 
Having set out what the Nice treaty does for the UK and for Europe, I should now like to set out what it does not do. Despite the warnings of some anti-European commentators, the treaty does not mean the end of the British justice system, a ban on political parties or an end to freedom of thought or religion. Nice is not a recipe for federalism, if by that is meant the creation of a centralised entity. It reinforces the role of national Governments and nation states because it ensures that we can go on making decisions in the Council of Ministers and at European Councils even in a greatly enlarged EU. 
Nice does not represent a fundamental alteration in our relationship with the EU or a radical restructuring of the EU. Rather, it preserves and enhances the UK's ability to influence decisions and take initiatives for the benefit of our citizens. For that reason it would be absurd to break with our tradition that Parliament should decide whether and how to amend treaties, and whether to hold a referendum on Nice--the more so since the Conservative Government did not hold a referendum on Maastricht, which involved much more wide-ranging changes. 
Mr. David Heath (Somerton and Frome): Will the Foreign Secretary give way? 
Mr. Straw: No, if the hon. Gentleman will excuse me, I will not. 
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To revert to the point that I was making about the Irish referendum, we have to find more effective ways of connecting the institutions of the EU to its people. Many activities and services are best carried out at the European, rather than the national, level, but unless and until the EU institutions become as responsive and accountable to our citizens as their national Governments are, it will always be hard to convince public opinion of that fact. 
We need to deal with that democratic deficit. We therefore agreed at Nice that there will be another intergovernmental conference in 2004. It will be different from its predecessors because it will be preceded by a wider and deeper public debate about the purpose and scope of European Union activity. 
We need to ask certain questions. Implicit in a question posed by the hon. Member for Buckingham is the important issue of subsidiarity, which has been difficult for the United Kingdom, with a political culture rather different from that of some European countries, to appreciate and accommodate. We have to ask what exactly is the European Union for? What precise purpose does it serve? To get the answer, we need to look at what the EU actually does, and analyse rigorously and frankly the tasks it does well, those it does less well and those that it does badly. Once we have a clear sense of our citizens' and constituents' priorities, only then can we sensibly ensure that the EU's institutions are properly organised and equipped to deliver them. The European Union is for Europe's citizenry, not its political elites. 
That means focusing discussion not on the process, but on the results of EU co-operation. Only ideologues and specialists are impassioned by esoteric technical issues like the extent of qualified majority voting or the limits of co-decision. People care most about the practical benefits and the added value that they may be able to derive from the EU: more jobs, cleaner streets and less crime. That is where the debate should begin. 
The next IGC is an opportunity for us to decide what the EU does best and which decisions are better taken at a national level. It is a chance to simplify the treaties so that they are easier to understand, and to give national Parliaments a more defined role in the EU. We are determined to improve the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the EU. 
The first and best way to bring the EU closer to the people is to make sure that they are informed about developments. More than any previous IGC, the Nice negotiations were carried out in full view of the British public and this House. A year before Nice, our White Paper set out the issues at length and outlined our negotiating objectives in detail before the negotiations even got under way. The key documents, including successive redrafts of the draft treaty, were available on the internet at every stage. Members of the Government gave many speeches and took part in debates up and down the country to get the message across and listen to people's views, both before and after Nice. The issues were raised in several debates in Parliament over the past year and a half. Of course, Parliament, as always, will decide whether the UK will ratify the treaty by enacting the Bill and making it law. 
Dr. Julian Lewis: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? 
Mr. Straw: No, I will not, because I am coming to the end of my observations. 
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Conservative Members, too, have played their part. Their wish to deny Europe the benefits of Nice--and hence enlargement--was the main plank of their election manifesto. It was they, not the Government, who said that they wanted the general election to be a referendum on Europe--[Interruption.] I said a moment ago to approbation from the Opposition that we should not quibble with the results of democratic votes. The only thing that I heard from the Conservative party throughout the campaign was that the election was a referendum on Europe. As I drew to the attention of the House during debate on the Loyal Address, that has now become non-history, as the whole Conservative manifesto has been wiped off the internet--[Hon. Members: "It has not."] It is true; I tried it myself. If one calls up Conservatives.com and types "manifesto" into the site's own search engine, one gets a blank. 
The Opposition must understand what happened at the election; they decided to campaign on Europe--and, by implication, matters like Nice--and they failed. It is not just me saying that; in The Times today, the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maples), the shadow Foreign Secretary's predecessor, made a proclamation. The headline states: 

"I will not make the same mistake--Ken Clarke will get my vote this time." 
In the article, he said: 

"Our position on the Nice treaty became unsustainable." 
There we have it; the former shadow Foreign Secretary simply could not stand the contradictions and twists and turns inherent in the Opposition's position. 
Passing this Bill is of very great importance. It will give a clear signal to Jan Kavan, Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic, all applicant nations of eastern and central Europe and to Cyprus and Malta that Britain is committed to righting the wrongs of history and to reuniting Europe. It will strengthen Britain's influence at the heart of this Europe of nation states. I therefore have no hesitation in commending the Bill to the House. 
Mr. Speaker: Before I call the mover of the amendment, I wish to inform the House that Back-Bench speeches will be limited to 10 minutes. 
4.11 pm
Mr. Francis Maude (Horsham): I beg to move, To leave out from 'That' to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof: 

'this House declines to give a Second Reading to the European Communities (Amendment) Bill because it fails to modernise the institutions and policies of the European Union to meet the requirements of a diverse, enlarged Union; takes no account of acknowledgements from Her Majesty's Government and the President of the Commission that ratification of the Treaty of Nice is not a legal or technical prerequisite of enlargement; works against speedy and successful enlargement by providing for further integration; fails to address reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, the single most important obstacle to such enlargement; ignores the wishes of those European Union citizens whose views have been sought in a referendum and fails to offer a similar opportunity to citizens of the United Kingdom; and diverts attention away from the pressing need for Her Majesty's Government to work with other member states and accession countries for the creation of a modern, flexible, reformed European Union.' 
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The treaty of Nice was a great opportunity for the European Union. It was an opportunity to put and make the case for the modern, reformed, outward-looking EU that its citizens plainly want and which enlargement will require. It could have been the moment to bid farewell to the old dogma of "one size fits all" political integration. It could have been the time to embrace the need for a decentralised and flexible EU. It could have set deadlines for enlargement, which we, as the Foreign Secretary has been good enough to accept, wholeheartedly support. Sadly, none of that transpired. The Nice treaty, I am afraid, was the triumph of old-think; it was locked in the past. 
Eleven and a half years after the fall of the Berlin wall, it is shameful that, with the solitary exception of the German Democratic Republic--East Germany--no central or eastern European country has been admitted to the Union. I remember attending meetings with Foreign Ministers from the region in 1990, at which they were told that enlargement was five years away. Here we are in 2001 and most of them are still five years away. Why has enlargement not been achieved? 
Dr. Nick Palmer (Broxtowe): How does the right hon. Gentleman reconcile those remarks with his opposition to a treaty that would allow access? Does he believe that that opposition would gain the support of a single one of the Governments of the applicant countries? 
Mr. Maude: I reject the premise of the hon. Gentleman's question--that the treaty is essential to enlargement. He need not rely on my word; the Foreign Secretary himself said at the Dispatch Box during debate on the Loyal Address that he accepted that the Nice treaty is not technically necessary for enlargement. 
Mr. Straw rose-- 
Mr. Maude: The point that I suspect the Foreign Secretary wishes to make is that a number of Governments have said that they will not permit enlargement unless the process of deeper integration goes ahead in the meantime. They have of course said that, but it is simply a statement of political preference. The treaty is, in no sense that anyone would recognise, a necessity for enlargement. There is no such legal necessity. 
Mr. Straw: This is extremely tedious for most of our citizens and constituents. We can call for the record if the right hon. Gentleman wants, but the simple fact is that, in debate on the Loyal Address, I was asked whether the treaty was technically required for accession. The answer is that technically and in legal theory we do not need this treaty, but we do need a treaty, which would still have to come before the House. 
The second point is that, politically, it would be impossible to conceive of accession without the modernisation and reforms of the Nice treaty. The question that the right hon. Gentleman must answer is: how on earth does he think the EU would work with 15, 20, 25 or 28 member states without such changes? 
Mr. Maude: I shall have something to say about how the European Union would work without these changes. Other changes may be needed, but the idea that the proposed changes are the only possible changes that are needed to make it work is fantasy. 
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It is correct to say that even if the treaty goes through, another treaty--an accession treaty--will be needed. No one can deny that. It is not only the Foreign Secretary who has said this. The President of the European Commission said that, legally, ratification of the Nice treaty is not necessary for enlargement. That is clearly the case. I hope that we can have an end to the nonsense that the Nice treaty is necessary. 
The previous Foreign Secretary made the same point, although he did not know it, in the aftermath of the Amsterdam treaty, when he announced proudly to the House that now that the Amsterdam treaty had been agreed, all the obstacles to enlargement were out of the way. Suddenly we find that there is another obstacle: the Nice treaty. [Interruption.] That is almost exactly what he said. We can call for the record if there is a dispute about it. He said: 

"In the aftermath of the Amsterdam treaty, the way is now clear for enlargement to happen." 
Funnily enough, it was not clear, according to the present Foreign Secretary and all his hon. Friends. Suddenly there is another obstacle. 
Dr. Julian Lewis: I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way. Did he notice that only a few minutes ago the Foreign Secretary conceded that if, in the end, the Irish do not ratify the Nice treaty, that treaty will be dead? Would my right hon. Friend be as interested as I would be to hear what the Foreign Secretary would propose with regard to enlargement if the Nice treaty were not ratified? Presumably, he would propose precisely the alternative treaty to which my right hon. Friend is rightly referring. 
Mr. Maude: The case that my hon. Friend puts in such a measured way is exactly the case that the shadow Cabinet and the then Leader of the Opposition put in 1992, after the Danish referendum result. They argued for postponement of discussion of the Bill, in order that the difficulty with the Maastricht treaty could be properly resolved, so that the House could know what treaty it was being asked to ratify. 
For the Foreign Secretary to take refuge in a decision of the General Affairs Council, and to say, "Oh well, the Council decided that matters had to go ahead, so we had no option" is a little feeble, to say the least. As the right hon. Gentleman made clear, without ratification and without a further referendum in Ireland which gives the consent of the Irish public to this treaty or to a treaty, this treaty is dead. It cannot proceed. 
Mr. Mark Hendrick (Preston) rose-- 
Mr. Maude: I give way to the hon. Gentleman, then I must make progress. 
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Mr. Hendrick: I thank the right hon. Gentleman. In the light of his earlier remarks about timetables for enlargement, does he agree that timetables for enlargement would have been folly, given that the Irish have not yet given their consent in a referendum? Furthermore, is it not true that, as in the case of Denmark, there can be as many referendums as the Irish Government want? 
Mr. Maude: That is a lovely idea, is it not? If one does not like the result, one just keeps on having referendums. 
4 Jul 2001 : Column 276
On the same basis, I could say that I did not like the result of the general election, so let us have another one. Let us carry on having votes until we get the result that we want. The arrogance of that approach is breathtaking. 
Dr. Phyllis Starkey (Milton Keynes, South-West) rose-- 
Mr. Maude: If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I must make progress. 
There was an active debate in Ireland about the merits of the Nice treaty and the Irish people said no. Which part of that answer did the Government not understand? It is a pretty simple, straightforward answer. 
On the point made by the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hendrick), by agreeing a rigidly integrationist treaty, which the Nice treaty is, we--I mean we collectively, we the European Union--have set enlargement back, for two reasons. One is that more integration sets up more hurdles for the applicant countries to jump. The second is that, as the Irish referendum result itself confirms, proceeding further with the process of integration generates a degree of political controversy which slows the enlargement process. 
There is plenty of evidence that enthusiasm in some of the eastern and central European countries for accession to the EU is dwindling. The central European correspondent of The Times recently observed: 

"Some 68 per cent. of Poles now believe that the country should delay enlargement rather than surrender important positions." 
Given the delicacy of the political situation in a number of the countries of eastern Europe--the case that all of us make for enlargement is that it is a way of stabilising those countries and bringing them into the family of democratic free market nations--we should be concerned about that. 
The correspondent went on to say: 

"Czechs are beginning to think aloud about what would happen if enlargement failed." 
Those concerns about enlargement are genuine. They are nothing to do with the Conservative party objecting to the Nice treaty or the result of the Irish referendum. They are due to the fact that the negotiations about enlargement have been extraordinarily protracted and the big issues have simply not begun to be resolved. 
We cannot accept the Bill or the treaty in its current form and we will oppose it. We will ask the House to vote for our reasoned amendment. As I said earlier, it would be wrong to proceed with the Bill at present. The Foreign Secretary has clarified for the House that the treaty will fall unless all member states have ratified it. 
Mr. Gordon Marsden (Blackpool, South): Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? 
Mr. Maude: No, I want to make some progress. 
There seems to be some reluctance through much of the rest of the EU to give voice to concerns about the treaty. Ex-President Giscard d'Estaing said in the French Parliament's debate on the treaty that, if the French people were offered a referendum, 

"you can bet that the answer would be an Irish song." 
4 Jul 2001 : Column 277 
That is a lyrical way of putting it, but one sees the point that he makes. The French people came within an ace of defeating the Maastricht treaty in 1992. How can we be at all certain that there is popular support in Britain, France, or any other country for the treaty? 
There will be a real problem if we in the EU give the impression that we treat the views of the public on these issues with disdain. A modern Europe cannot treat the views of its citizens as an awkward impediment that has to be overcome. We should be listening to the concerns of our people, particularly those raised in the Irish referendum. 
The EU and its leaders have failed to dispel the impression that they propose to bash on regardless of public opinion, and nothing that the Foreign Secretary said today in any way draws back from that. It is sad to see that that is the case. 
Angus Robertson (Moray): Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? 
Mr. Maude: No, I shall make progress. 
I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will agree that nothing could be more dangerous for public support for the EU, which I agree it is important to promote and sustain, than to treat the referendum result with the kind of contempt that we are hearing from him and from others. 
Mr. Cash: Will my right hon. Friend give way? 
Mr. Maude: I shall in a moment. 
To those who dissent from that, I have to say that the Government's determination to press ahead at full speed with the Bill at this time gives the impression that the views of the Irish public are set at nought. It shows no respect at all for the concerns that have been raised there. It is in that sense that EU leaders are treating the views of the public with contempt. 
It is accepted that Giscard d'Estaing said that the French public may well not support this, and I should not be at all surprised. I suspect that the British public would not support the treaty if they were offered the opportunity in a referendum. 
Mr. Nigel Beard (Bexleyheath and Crayford): Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? 
Mr. Maude: No, I shall make some progress. 
There is a real danger here of the political leaders being genuinely alienated from the public whom we are meant to represent. 
Mr. Cash: Having taken some part in the French and Danish referendums, as well as the recent Irish referendum, may I ask my right hon. Friend why we on this side of the House are not prepared at this juncture to have a referendum on the whole European issue, given that the single currency is certainly not the only issue at stake? There was no referendum when our referendum campaign managed to get 500,000 votes in favour of a 
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vote on Maastricht. With the involvement of defence and foreign policy, we should be considering a broader referendum to obtain the full consent of the British people. 
Mr. Maude: In the broad-ranging policy review upon which I feel that the party is about to embark, I am confident that my hon. Friend will want to make that point. I am sure that he will be very active in that respect. 
Mr. Straw: What is the right hon. Gentleman's view? 
Mr. Maude: I take the view that the British public should have the opportunity to express their opinion on the treaty in a referendum, in the same way as the public in the Republic of Ireland. 
Angus Robertson: Why does the right hon. Gentleman think it right for the people of the UK to be given a choice in a referendum on the Nice treaty, but not on the Maastricht treaty? 
Mr. Maude: Since the Maastricht treaty was decided upon, we have gone considerably further down the path towards full-scale political integration. There is now a growing gap between what the public and the politicians think about these matters. Unless we make a connection by allowing the public to have a direct say on this specific issue, we will be in danger of allowing a big gulf to develop, which will undermine the very democracy upon which we depend. 
In such a referendum, we would be very clear about what we favour. We will support parts of the Nice treaty that may be genuinely useful in enabling enlargement to occur. Protocol A of the treaty, to which the Foreign Secretary referred, deals with the reallocation of seats in the European Parliament and the reweighting of votes in the Council. I do not take as much pleasure as him in the fact that we can now override the wishes of smaller EU countries--a point upon which he dwelt rather gloatingly. His attitude did not seem quite in accord with the spirit of harmonious friendship in which we should be approaching the enterprise. The amendment to the size of the European Commission is also a welcome step and we support it. 
We would like the reforms to go further. We would like the Commission to revert to an institution whose nature resembles much more that of an impartial civil service. That was very much the conception of its founding fathers. We would like the balance of power to shift from the European Commission to the Council of Ministers. We would also like moves to be made to strengthen democratic accountability. Each country could place a national Minister at the head of its Brussels delegation, to be directly accountable to national Parliaments. That seems to us the right approach to filling the democratic deficit. I hope that the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues will respond positively to such approaches, which are the right direction for reform of the European Union as an institution and will become more necessary as time passes. 
Institutional reform is only a fraction of the final agreement at Nice, whose focus clearly lies elsewhere. Tighter integration is the defining characteristic of the treaty, and qualified majority voting is extended in 31 articles. We believe that this one-way process, in 
4 Jul 2001 : Column 279
which powers are transferred only in one direction, is not in British interests and is not the right way of creating European harmony. There is a great difference between European integration and European unity, although people have for some time tended to use the two phrases almost interchangeably. 
We understand absolutely the desire of our partners in Europe to build structures that make unthinkable the sort of deadly and protracted conflicts that have devastated Europe all too often, but today, surely we could and should be seeking more modern and sophisticated ways of bringing Europe together. If one cares about European harmony, as we do, the very last thing to do is to extend the areas in which the majority can ride roughshod over the wishes of a minority. That is a recipe for discord, not harmony. It is a recipe for division, not unity. 
The view from outside the European Union beltway is revealing. The Foreign Secretary referred to the Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic; I shall quote the Speaker of the Czech Parliament, Mr. Vaclav Klaus. [Interruption.] It is worth listening to the quote because hon. Members may learn something from it. Mr. Klaus said: 

"The agreement from Nice was in no way about EU enlargement . . . It was about internal changes within the European Union, which might possibly facilitate" 
the entry of new members. 

However, there was nothing essential about EU enlargement in the agreement. In my opinion, the main thing was that in several hundreds of areas--I mean the regulation of this or that type of business, or the regulation of other matters--a huge shift occurred from a unanimous vote required for these matters until now to a majority vote." 
The important part follows: 

"This means that the role of an individual country is substantially decreasing while the role of the whole is substantially growing . . . It was yet another distinct step toward unification and toward transferring powers from individual states somewhere to the top." 
That is a penetrating analysis with which we agree. 
A brief look back at the words of the Government and the previous Foreign Secretary before departing for Nice confirms the accuracy of Mr. Klaus's view of the treaty's emphasis. The previous Foreign Secretary made several statements about what he would do at Nice. He leaves a difficult legacy for his successor. He said that he would not regard a change to qualified majority voting on most of the items on the list of 50 aspects proposed by the French presidency as acceptable. He believed that only a minority would be acceptable. However, he had a change of heart at the negotiating table and agreed to QMV for more than half of them. 
The right hon. Gentleman said that extending QMV to anti-discrimination measures would be unacceptable. He had a change of heart at Nice. He said that he was not wildly enthusiastic about the move on European political parties. Again, he had a sudden change of heart in the sunshine of Nice. Perhaps it was not unconnected with the proposal that he would take on the presidency of the European party of socialists. From his first days in office, the current Foreign Secretary knows that agreeing to extend QMV means that we lose influence and power. 
The Government agreed to the social chapter in the early days of the previous Parliament. They claimed that it would have no bad effects, and that there was nothing to worry about. However, they had to spend the election 
4 Jul 2001 : Column 280
campaign trying to cover up the effect of the works council directive. The Government rightly object to it; we support them on that. However, it has gone through despite the Government's opposition because they gave up the veto. 
There is clear evidence of the loss of the influence of the House and the British Government through giving up the veto. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary can explain the benefits that accrue from extending QMV to article 13, which applies to anti-discrimination measures. How will it benefit the British public? What are the implications of extending QMV to articles 100(1) and 100(2)? In terms of the article, what does a shortage in the supply of specific products mean? To which products does it apply? What measures can we deploy since the previous Foreign Secretary signed us up to QMV? What great benefits flow to Britain from that? 
What would the Government's response be if the Foreign Secretary were outvoted on the choice of a common foreign policy representative? That could arise through a change that his predecessor agreed at Nice. Are the Government happy that, in principle, it is possible for European foreign policy to be run in the name of the British Government, represented by a person whose candidature they did not support? 
I have outlined only a handful of the commitments that the Government have signed. It is right to scrutinise them, and we shall do that in Committee. However, surely it is sensible to call a halt to the Bill and broaden the debate on the treaty's implications through a referendum. The public could then participate and express their views on it. 
Let us revert to enlargement and the idea that the necessary and desirable--in our view--reopening of the Nice treaty would delay enlargement. I have the direct quote to which I referred from the Foreign Secretary's predecessor, which comes from the debates after the Amsterdam treaty. He said: 

"One of the great gains of reaching agreement at Amsterdam is that it has cleared the way forward for enlargement."---[Official Report, 12 November 1997; Vol. 300, c. 918.] 
A year later, the then Foreign Secretary opined that there was no 

immense enthusiasm on the part either of Europe or of Britain to commence an intergovernmental conference so soon after Amsterdam." 
When that enthusiasm suddenly materialised, the right hon. Gentleman needed an excuse to justify the further intergovernmental conference and the further treaty, and he turned again to enlargement. He said: 

"Enlargement will not be possible unless we ratify the treaty of Nice in the meantime."---[Official Report, 23 January 2001; Vol. 361, c. 797.] 
That is what he said earlier this year. 
We had earlier warned that further integration and further treaty changes that take us further down the path to political, old-fashioned, one-size-fits-all political integration will not expedite enlargement but delay it, as it is doing, by adding to the burden that applicants have to absorb. By generating political controversy, as evidenced in the Irish referendum, enlargement will be delayed. 
I said at the time of the Nice treaty: 

"This summit had nothing to do with what is needed to allow enlargement to take place. All the extensions of QMV--some major, some minor--go in one direction only, towards further integration."--[Official Report, 11 December 2000; Vol. 359, c. 394.] 
4 Jul 2001 : Column 281 
We would have been a bit more relaxed if there had been any evidence that at Nice the Government were pressing for there to be a two-way street, with some powers being returned to member states for decision. That is how a modernising European Union should be developing. It should be aiming to decentralise. 
When the Minister for Europe was a Back-Bench Member and a strong europe sceptic, he used to make the case for a decentralised EU. As time has passed and the process of globalisation has accelerated, the case for decentralising the EU becomes stronger and stronger. Let us be clear that the Bill is not about enlargement. If anything, it is an impediment to enlargement. That which is necessary for enlargement has not been addressed. 
Joyce Quin (Gateshead, East and Washington, West): The right hon. Gentleman says that the Bill has nothing to do with enlargement. Surely he remembers that at the time of the Amsterdam treaty there were various matters that were called left-overs. Those matters were dealt with at the Nice treaty, and there was a clear link between them and enlargement. 
Mr. Maude: I do not know whether the right hon. Lady, as Minister for Europe, drafted the then Foreign Secretary's words when he said that agreement at Amsterdam had cleared the way for enlargement. That seems to be fairly unequivocal and fairly unambiguous. He did not say, "By the way, there are all these other things that we must decide in the meantime." 
The matters that we are discussing are not needed for enlargement. We know that there is a political desire--this is what really is going on--among some leaders in Europe to take further the process of deeper political integration before enlargement happens. They suspect--for all I know they may be right--that the new candidate countries will be less amenable to proceeding with deepening integration than current members. 
It seems an un-European approach to decide to have a tightly closed club where we make our own rules before we open our arms to embrace the entire family of European nations, which is what I regard as the historic destiny of the EU, and which must be done. It seems profoundly wrong to introduce tighter rules and then to say to all candidate countries, "Here is it is, take it or leave it--these are the rules, which we decided while you were waiting outside, and you must accept them as they are." It is wrong that the EU has gone down that path. It is wrong also that the Government have acquiesced in, and in some ways promoted, that approach. 
The things that are necessary for enlargement to take place have not been addressed by the Government, and especially radical reform of the common agricultural policy. When I raised the issue during the previous Parliament, the then Foreign Secretary used to sneer and say, "That is completely unnecessary. It has all been dealt with at Berlin. There is nothing to worry about." However, the Prime Minister said-- 
Dr. Starkey: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? 
Mr. Maude: I must make some progress. 
4 Jul 2001 : Column 282
The Prime Minister himself said, as long ago as 1995, in his early days as leader of the Labour party: 

"Britain could set the agenda in Europe . . . reforming the CAP both because it is right and"-- 
this is important-- 

"as a necessary precondition to the enlargement to include the countries of central and eastern Europe." 
Then, he was absolutely right: it was a necessary precondition. We know that it still is, because in all the negotiations that are going on there has been no agreement, so far as I am aware, on the chapter concerning agriculture with any of the candidate countries. There are big problems with structural funds as well, but the biggest problem is agriculture. 
When one asks someone from one of the Governments in question, "How is it going with the negotiations?", they say, "Oh, it's going splendidly. We've just got agriculture and the structural funds to deal with." Those are the big problems, the really difficult ones. That is why, if Nice had been genuinely a summit to deal with enlargement, it would have addressed those issues. However, it did not, and so far as I am aware, neither the then Foreign Secretary nor the Prime Minister made the slightest effort even to get the reform of the common agricultural policy on the agenda at Nice, let alone tried to get it dealt with. Yet by their own admission--now conveniently forgotten--they have accepted that that reform is essentially necessary to enable enlargement to take place. 
Dr. Starkey: May I point out to the right hon. Gentleman that, if he had read the excellent report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he would know that six of the applicant countries had closed the chapter on agriculture? 
Mr. Maude: This has been the longest-standing problem and it has delayed matters immensely. It took so long because it was necessary to negotiate immensely lengthy transitional proceedings, as there had been no serious reform of the CAP. 
Everyone agrees that the European Union has to change. It needs to turn the challenges facing us, which concern many people, into opportunities. The European Union needs to be more relevant and more immediate to its current and future members. The answer is not simply to steam on regardless in the same dogmatic direction. We must require the European Union to re-examine itself. It has already succeeded in building the biggest single market in the world, and I think that the previous Conservative Administration can take some credit for that. I spent two happy years in the late 1980s negotiating a number of the directives that opened up--not in a perfect way, of course--that single market. 
The European Union must now adapt to the era of decentralisation and to the network age. At present, too many of its structures are rigid, and too many of its aspirant members are being forced to sign up to the approaches of the past. In the network age, this rigid and centralised model of European power is not only inappropriate and outdated but a recipe for division and fracture. In today's world of global economic integration, the creation of big centralised blocs simply does not make sense any more. 
We in the European Union can no longer afford to be impervious to the trend of change across the world and still expect to succeed. Through low turnouts in European 
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elections and falling support in opinion polls, the people of Europe have sent a clear message to their Governments. It is that real unity across Europe cannot be imposed by integrationist treaties or by diktat. 
Last September, the Danish people made their views clear in their referendum on the euro. In March, the Swiss rejected early membership of the EU by as many as four to one. Whatever the merits of the case for Swiss membership of the EU, that result ought at least to give us cause to stop and think, "Why did this happen?" Plenty of people might say, "The Swiss have just got to make the necessary changes to allow them to join." But should not we in the European Union, when we consider a stable democracy as prosperous as Switzerland, ask ourselves, "What is it about the European Union that makes a country as successful as Switzerland decide so overwhelmingly that it does not even want to contemplate negotiating to join it?" Of course, if Switzerland were to join the European Union, it would have to make a lot of changes. However, it is worth our while to reflect for a moment on whether the European Union could effect any changes to make itself an attractive place for a country as successful as Switzerland to join. 
We need a fresh and more modern approach to Europe. In this electronic age, the EU needs agility, adaptability, flexibility and a light touch from the state if we are to realise the goal of a stable, prosperous, outward looking, free market, democratic Europe. We have a positive vision of an EU of constant change, constant bargaining and constant negotiation. We believe that that vision is true to both the spirit of the goals of Europe's founding fathers and the demands of our age; and that it would free Europe to prosper, rather than bind it with rigid rule and diktat. 
A constitution for the EU, which has been proposed by some, would prevent that continual process of renewal, bargaining and change from happening. Far from lumbering from treaty to treaty, as the EU is increasingly prone to do, our vision would achieve a multi-system Europe in which groups of countries--different combinations for different purposes and to differing extents--would proceed to integrate and co-operate in different ways according to their different choices. That vision represents a more modern, more sophisticated, decentralised EU. 
We want an open, flexible, free enterprise Europe that is ready to serve the whole of Europe--a Europe that celebrates diversity in culture, ethnic background, language, history, outlook and perspective and which does not try to stifle and submerge that diversity. I am afraid that the Bill and the Nice treaty take Europe in the wrong direction--back to the old world of tightly integrated, centralised regional blocks. That is wrong, and we shall vote against the Bill. 
Several hon. Members rose-- 
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Michael Lord): Before I call the next speaker, I should tell the House that Mr. Speaker has placed a 10-minute limit on all Back-Bench speeches. It applies from now on. 
4.47 pm
Joyce Quin (Gateshead, East and Washington, West): Unlike the right hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Maude), who spoke for the Opposition, I welcome the Nice treaty 
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and the fact that we are beginning the ratification process in the House today. I warmly congratulate my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench on their appointment and wish them well in building on the work done by the Foreign Secretary's predecessor in the important sphere of European policy. 
The Nice treaty is fairly modest, but it makes real improvements, particularly in terms of vote reweighting in the Council of Ministers, sensible changes in the European Parliament and sensible reforms in the European Court of Justice. Overall, the Government promoted and safeguarded British interests in the negotiation and built on both the success of the Berlin settlement, which we debated in the House yesterday, and the gains that they achieved in the Amsterdam treaty. 
In all three negotiations, the Government showed that they could successfully negotiate for Britain without being isolated, and there was certainly no repetition of the disastrous policy of non-co-operation which the previous Government tried for a time. Furthermore, I find the Opposition's arguments curious. The treaty is modest, so wanting to hold a referendum on it when no referendum was held on either the Single European Act or the Maastricht treaty, for which they were responsible, defies belief. 
Conservative Members often refer to attitudes and arguments in Denmark, where there is a strong degree of Euro-scepticism on occasion. I say to them that the Danish Folketing thought the treaty so modest that it did not represent changes in terms of integration. Therefore, the Folketing recommended that a referendum should not be held, and that recommendation was accepted. Indeed, there was a healthy majority in favour of the Nice treaty when it was voted on in the Danish Parliament. 
However, the fact that a referendum on the treaty is not being held in this country should not make us shy of having a public debate on Europe. Indeed, I am pleased that Europe, among many other important matters that were debated, was an issue in the general election campaign. I am glad that the result of the general election seemed to confirm that people believe that the Government have been doing a good negotiating job in Europe, and I strongly agree with that..

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